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Abstract
This paper suggests that there are consistent patterns in how different groups of individuals
perceive their relative ideological position. Using data from a large-scale cross-country survey
on individuals’ views and personal characteristics it compares who reports themselves as being
left(right) wing and who on an objective measure are actually left(right) wing. It ﬁnds, for
example, the more educated on average believe themselves to be more left wing than their
actual beliefs on a substantive issue might suggest.
Keywords: Ideology, Voter Preferences
Acknowledgements: IwouldliketothankJonathanTempleformanyhelpfulconversationsduringthe
course of this project. The usual disclaimer applies.Email:james.rockey@le.ac.uk2
Introduction
“Ideologies are those systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or
unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of
thepoliticalworldthey, orthosewhopreoccupytheirthoughts, inhabitandthenact
on that understanding.” - Freeden (1996, p.3)
Freeden’s is a particular philosophical conception of ideologies, but to an extent it suggests
that individuals’ political preferences should be expected to exhibit great spatial and temporal
variation as the world they encounter varies. This paper investigates two related questions.
Firstly, it investigates how individuals’ ideologies vary based on their characteristics; age,
gender,education,income,etc. Secondly,itanalyseshowthesamesetofcharacteristicsexplain
variation in an individual’s perception of their ideological position. It provides evidence of
systematic differences in ideological position, and consistent misperception by individuals of
their own relative ideological position. These results are of interest for many reasons, but it is
argued that they are particularly relevant in the context of much recent research investigating
the determinants and consequences of variation in political preferences. If as argued, there
are consistent differences between self-perceived and objectively measured views, then it is
important to remain mindful of which is relevant to any given question, and the implications
for broader inference.
In particular this paper aims to speak to two related areas of study. The ﬁrst is concerned
with understanding empirically demographic patterns in voting behaviour, including how they
vary over time, for example Gelman et al. (2008) study voting behaviour in the US. The second
considers the impact of individual traits. For example, Aidt and Dallal (2008) suggest that
female suffrage led to increases in taxation and government spending. This research also
relates to the debate concerning how reasonable it is to assume that voters vote rationally,
and to what extent they are prejudiced in favour of policies not in their interest (c.f Caplan
(2007)). Taken together it would seem that documenting individuals’ misperceptions of their
ideological position provides an important alternative hypothesis for how these demographic
and genetic sources of variation affect aggregate outcomes. Perhaps, if deciding for whom
to vote on the basis of party or candidate differences is likely to prove time-consuming or
difﬁcult voters use their perceived relative ideological position as a convenient heuristic. This
has important implications for the understanding of the practice of democracy for a variety of
reasons. Perhaps most importantly, if people misperceive their location on some ideological
spectrum, do they mis-vote rationally? For a simple example, consider a two-party system in
which there is a “left” party and a “right” party. If information on parties’ positions is costly to
obtain, they might rationally vote for a party that does not represent their interests.3
This paper attempts to answer some of these questions using data describing individuals’
beliefs and circumstances from the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) . The WVS
data are based on interviews in 84 countries, of on average 1,500, individuals. In particular,
whataretheindividualcharacteristicsofthosewhoconsiderthemselvestoberightorleftwing?
Are those who perceive themselves to be right (left) wing, on average, also those who might be
considered right (left) wing on a more objective criterion? Based upon the results of a bivariate
ordered probit model, the analysis will suggest that many individuals who think they are right
(left)wingareactuallyleft(right)wing. Forexample, men, themoreeducated, andthoseinfull-
time employment on average consider themselves to be more left wing than they are measured
as being.
1. Deﬁning left and right wing
The terms left wing and right wing have their origins in the estates-general of 1789 just prior to
the French Revolution. Today, the ideas “Right” and “Left” have very different meanings that
vary between and within countries. There have been many attempts to codify what is meant
by left and right, and some of these attempts have abandoned a left-right spectrum in favour
of a two-dimensional grid.1 However a key development in the categorization of ideological
position is that of Poole and Rosenthal (1997). They estimate the ideological positions of
US congressmen for the ﬁrst 100 congresses and in more recent work (Poole and Rosenthal
(2006)) have provided estimates up to and including the 109th congress (2005-2007). The
preferencesandbehaviourofpoliticiansarenotthefocusofthispaper,butPooleandRosenthal
demonstrated that ideologies could be compared over long periods of time (for the US they
specify any of the “stable two party periods”). They further demonstrate that ideology can be
reduced to one or two dimensions. This reduction is justiﬁed by Poole and Rosenthal (2006)
who ﬁnd that 81 percent of the 13 million roll call votes made in the congress since 1789 can
be explained with one liberal - conservative ideological dimension. 85 percent of variation
can be explained using two dimensions, with no meaningful improvement with three or more.
It is argued that whilst these results are for the US only, that 81 percent of the variation in a
country as politically diverse as the US over such long periods can be explained by a single
left-right dimension, vitiates the assumption discussed below that ideological variation can be
adequately described using a single left-right dimension.
1Examples of this include the chart developed by Pournelle (1963) which locates ideologies on two axes, deﬁned by
statism and rationalism. The rationalism dimension refers not to the underlying rationality of the ideology, but rather
totheextentthatitisbelievedthatsocietalproblemscanberesolvedthroughrationalanalysisandensuingaction. The
second dimension distinguishes between those who believe that the State is a powerful force for good (state worship)
and those who believe it is, at best, a necessary evil. A common alternative places Communism and Neo-Liberalism as
the extremes on a left-right economic dimension, and Libertarianism (Anarchism) and Authoritarianism (Fascism) as
the limits of a social-policy dimension.4
2. Related Literature
This section discusses some of the relevant literature. Rather than attempt to provide a survey
ofhowtheroleofideologyhasbeenmeasuredinpreviouswork,itwillﬁrstconsiderrecentwork
that describes the determinants of ideology and political beliefs at the individual level and then
consider the evidence for its effects.
The ﬁrst body of work seeks to understand the distribution of voters’ preferences. An-
solabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2005) describe “Purple America” in which they argue that
the oft described red-state/blue-state dichotomy is not supported by the evidence. More
relevantly, they argue that the conventional rational choice models of voters acting solely in
their economic interest ignore important moral and religious cleavages. But they do provide
evidence that these issues are less important in determining voters’ behaviour than economic
issues. One recent example of this question that has recently attracted much popular and
academic attention is of voting patterns in the USA. Frank (2005) asked “What’s the matter
with Kansas?” and questioned why white working-class voters have systematically voted in a
manner apparently contrary to their economic interests (I.E. Republican). Frank’s answer is
that they do so due to the relative importance they place on non-economic (I.E. social, moral,
or religious) issues. One of the many scholars to dispute this thesis was Bartels (2006) who
presented statistical evidence that suggests the opposite. He argues that the voters Frank
describes actually are more likely to vote Democratic than they were historically, and are no
moreconservative,thattheyvoteonthebasisofeconomicissues,andthatChristiansbasetheir
economic views on their faith to a greater extent than they do their views on non-economic
issues. Gelman et al. (2007, 2008) argue such distinctions between rich and poor, or religious
and irreligious voters are misleading. Gelman et al extend this debate to ask why and how
is it the case that rich states vote Democratic, but rich individuals vote Republican. Using a
MultilevelmethodologytheyshowthatinfactitisinaccuratetogeneraliseaboutRedStatesand
BlueStates, religiousandnon-religious, orrichandpoorvoters. Rather, whilstingeneralricher
voters care more about non-economic issues, they are also more polarized. That is, rich voters
in RedStates aremore likelyto beRepublican, richvoters in BlueStates votedisproportionately
Democratic. In poor states it is the rich who attend church, the opposite is true in rich states.
Other studies have focused on a related speciﬁc question. They analyse why it is that there
is a ‘Political Gender Gap’. Edlund and Pande (2002) argue that the decline in US marriage
rates (and the increase in divorce rates) has made women less well-off and men better-off.
They provide evidence that this decline is associated with the rise of a difference in political
allegiancebetweenmenandwomen. Thisgapwasaround15percentagepointsby1996,whilst
in general prior to 1980 there was no signiﬁcant gap. Moreover, they suggest that around three
percentage points of the Political Gender Gap, can be attributed to the impact of divorce on5
the voting intentions of women. Aidt and Dallal (2008) exploit the variation in when Women
gained the franchise in Europe to obtain results that “support the hypothesis that countries
experienced an increase in social spending after women were given voting rights. In the short-
run, the effect is a 0.6-1.2% increase [...] the long run impact beeing three to eight times larger.”
Cavalcanti and Tavares (2006) argue that as income per capita increases women substitute
renumerated employment for household production, and that this leads to the demand for
government services. Their headline empirical result, coinciding with the predictions of their
theoretical analysis, is that “an increase in female labour force participation of 10% leads to a
increase of government spending of about 2.5 percent as a share of GDP”. Funk and Gathmann
(2008) suggest using data from Swiss Referenda that men and women favour different policies,
ceterisparibus. Inparticular,womenseemto“caremoreabouttheenvironment,publichealth,
social welfare and are more skeptical towards nuclear energy or the military. Regarding the
ﬁscalconsequencesoffemalepolicymakers,weﬁndabiggerimpactonthecompositionrather
than the size of government.”There is also evidence for a ‘Political Gender Knowldege Gap’,
for example Frazer and Macdonald (2003) provide evidence that all else equal British women
have less ‘political knowledge than men’. More generally, they ﬁnd that the younger and less
educated are less knowledgable about politics based on answers to a set of questions. Mondak
and Anderson (2004) argue that the size of the gap is inﬂated but otherwise suggest that young,
uneducated, and female Americans are more likely to be politically uninformed. This result
is perhaps less surprising if considered in the context of the emergent literature emphasising
the role of physiological and genetic traits as determinants of political behaviour. Oxley et al.
(2008) argue that political views are associated with sensitivity to perceived threats, those with
lower physical sensitivity were more likely to favour ‘liberal’ policies, and vice-versa. Fowler et
al. (2008) and Alford et al. (2005) use twin studies to measure the effects of genetic variation as
a determinant of the tendency to vote and political ideology respectively. They ﬁnd that greater
genetic similarity leads to more similar political behaviour.2 However, as Alford et al. (2005)
note this is not an argument for genetic determinism.
Indeed recent work has also suggested how macroeconomic factors can alter political
preferences. Di Tella and MaCulloch (2007) suggest using data from the WVS that individuals
who perceive corruption as being widespread are more likely to be left-wing. In common
with this paper they use the WVS to obtain estimates for a cross-section of countries on
individual beliefs. These results are complemented by country-level panel data estimates of
the relationship between corruption and the ideology of different branches of government.
They present a persuasive argument that corruption (which they formally model as having a
disincentive externality for entrepreneurs) leads individuals to become more left-wing, that is
2Both studies compare the difference in the variance of turnout rate/political attitudes between monozygotic twins
(who share 100% of their DNA) and dizygotic twins (who share on average 50%).6
to advocate greater redistribution, and hence impedes the ﬂow of capitalism to poor countries.
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) review the literature on ‘Preferences for Redistribution’. They,
like this paper, analyse survey data, in particular the US General Social Survey and the WVS.
They ask: What makes individuals desire more or less inequality? Broadly, they consider two
classes of explanations. Individuals may care about inequality because of its impact in some
way upon themselves (E.G. due to some expected affect on crime, their own social mobility,
etc) or because they desire an income distribution compatible with a preferred concept of
social justice. In particular their results suggest that within the US, Women, Blacks, and the
more educated all tend to have a greater preference for redistribution. They also report results
including measures of individuals’ experience of misfortune. These suggest that individuals’
gender, race, and religion are still important determinant of preferences even conditional on
experience of misfortune or perceptions of fairness.
In sum, it is clear that the determinants of political preferences remains an important ques-
tion, and that some conﬁdence can placed in measures derived from survey data. Moreover,
taking together Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2006) and Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2005)
suggeststhatquantifyingtheideologicalpositionsofbothUSvotersandpoliticianscanbedone
with some reliability. Furthermore, Di Tella and MaCulloch (2007) and Alesina and Giuliano
(2009) suggest that this quantiﬁcation can be done successfully for multiple countries.
3. Data
TheWVScontainsquestionsconcerningtheviewsofover280,000individualsin84countrieson
awidevarietyofissuesaswellasdataabouttheirpersonalcharacteristics.3 Suchquestionsvary
from the perceived prevalence of drink-driving (most common in Hungary), whether output
should be sacriﬁced in order to protect the environment, to the importance of family (most
important in China), or whether military rule is preferable (most favoured in Vietnam). The
focus of this paper is on political preferences and individual characteristics. In this section the
rationale for the choice of the variables used will be outlined and the tradeoffs these choices
embody discussed.
3The data are taken from all ﬁve waves of the World Values Survey conducted in 1981-1984, 1989-1991, 1994-
1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2008 respectively. Data for the variables used in this paper were available for 82 countries.
These were: Albania Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia
And Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico,
Moldova, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Slovakia, Viet Nam, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Trinidad And Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Macedonia, Egypt, Tanzania, United States, Burkina Faso, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Serbia And Montenegro, Zambia, Northern Ireland, and Serbia7
3.1. Dependent Variables
As described above the ﬁrst dependent variable used in this paper describes individuals’ self-
perception of their political beliefs, that is how left or right wing they consider themselves to
be. It does not deﬁne what the different values mean: for example, what 2 means compared to
3 is left as a judgement for the individual. In particular the variable E033, referred to here as
rightleft, was chosen. It asked:
Inpoliticalmatters, peopletalkof“theleft”and“theright.”Howwouldyouplace
your views on this scale, generally speaking?
1: ‘Left’
2: ‘2’
:
:
9: ‘9’
10: ‘Right’
Given the discussion above of two-dimensional characterizations of ideology it might seem
that this measure is inherently ﬂawed. But it is argued that given the lack of consensus on what
thedimensionsshouldbeinamulti-dimensionalmodelofideology, andthedifﬁcultyofasking
individuals to locate themselves in multi-dimensional ideological space, this variable has some
clear advantages.
The decision as to which variable represents best the actual political preferences of indi-
viduals is further complicated by, as discussed above, the possibility that the nature of political
debateandtheideologicalcleavagesthatmotivateitvarysubstantiallybetweencountries. This
additionalconcernnecessitatesusingavariablethatbothrepresentsasmuchaspossibleofthe
variation in individuals’ ideological position, whilst remaining consistent in its interpretation
across countries. For this reason the variable, E035, or here moreineq, was chosen, which is
based upon the following question:
“Incomes should be made more equal vs We need larger income differences as
incentives. How would you place your views on this scale?
1: ‘Incomes should be made more equal’
2: ‘2’
:
:
9: ‘9’
10:‘We need larger income differences as incentives’8
Hence, moreineq can be seen to represent what Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2007)
refer to as the ”old debate”, that is, the traditional conﬂict between equality and efﬁciency. The
relative merits of the arguments that increased inequality improves efﬁciency or that greater
equality is the more ethical outcome are ignored here. It sufﬁces to assert that a great deal
of current and historical political debate has centred around arguments like this or those that
embody similar ideological principles. For example, a debate on how health care or education
should be provided is in essence very similar: a conﬂict between ideas of equality of provision
and the mooted greater efﬁciency of the market.
Since, moreineq is related to desire for change in income inequality it is comparable across
countries. More generally, since the question is focused on what explains the variation in
perceived and underlying ideological positions within countries, differences in the average
ideological position between countries are not important.
To check that the results are not artifacts of moreineq the analysis was also repeated for
the binary variable secfair. This variable was derived from WVS question c039 and asks the
respondent whether the following scenario is fair or not fair.
Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One ﬁnds
out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary,
however, is quicker, more efﬁcient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it
fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?
This question is felt to be meaningfully different to moreineq, in particular because it describes
a scenario rather than a conceptual choice, whilst also measuring the respondents’ views on
the same equality-incentives dimension.
3.2. Independent Variables
The choice of the independent variables was driven by two main issues, exogeneity and data-
availability. Whilst there is a great wealth of data contained in the WVS concerning individuals’
viewsonavarietyoftopicsthesevariablesweredisregardedasitisplausiblethattheseviewsare
a product of the same processes responsible for determining ideological position, and would
therefore give rise to a potential endogeneity problem.4 Similarly, the WVS contains a large
number of variables describing individuals’ membership of, and participation in, a wide range
of societal institutions such as trade unions, religious groups, local politics, etc. Again, the
decision to become involved with such an organisation can be seen to be potentially related to
4Section E of the WVS contains a variety of questions related to political behaviour and preferences. These
include questions on political activism (e.g. willingness to strike, engage in a boycott, etc.), membership of political
organisations (e.g. environmental groups, trade unions, local or national political parties), and preferences on
particular issues (e.g. immigration, military action, social services provision).9
ideology,andinparticulartheintensityofideologicalviews. Finally,manyvariablesconcerning
individual characteristics had to be excluded since they were only available for many fewer
observations.
Consequently, the following independent variables were chosen in order to maximize
sample size and ensure plausible exogeneity. The variables describing basic personal in-
formation are male, age100, hadnokids (the respondent’s gender, age divided by 100, and
whether the respondent had no children), and livewith (whether the respondent lives with
their parents). Also included, were variables describing labour market activity: fulltime
(whether the respondent worked full-time), parttime (whether the respondent worked part-
time), selfemployed (if the individual was self-employed), retired, housewife, andstudent, with
unemployed the omitted category.
Information was also available on the type of job the respondent had and the following
dummy variables were used to describe job type; seniornonmanual (employer/manager/pro-
fessional), seniormanual (foreman, farmer), skilledmanual, andsoldier. Theomittedcategory
is non-manual, non-senior, ofﬁce workers. In addition data are available on the socio-
economic class of the respondent. This is measured by two different variables, the ﬁrst is self-
reported i.e. what class the respondent believes they belong to, and the second is based upon
the interviewer’s judgement. Again these variables are represented by binary variables for each
class. For self-reported socio-economic class these are, upper middle class uppermiddle sr,
lower middle class lowermiddle sr, working class workingclass sr and lower class lowerclass sr.
Upper class, upper sr is the omitted category. The objective measure deﬁnes social-economic
status in terms of the standard abc1 categories. In particular, ses c1 refers to non-manual
middle class occupations such as junior management, and owners of small businesses. ses c2
refers to skilled and supervisory manual workers. ses de refers to unskilled workers or the
unemployed. The omitted category is ses ab which corresponds to upper and upper-middle
class respondents.
Other variables were oecd which describes if the individual lives in an OECD member
country. highesteduc described the highest level of education achieved on an 8 point scale
from no formal education to having achieved a university degree. The income decile in which
respondents’ perceived themselves as being in is measured by scaleofy.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the independent variables and the three dependent
variables. Also included were country and wave ﬁxed effects.10
4. Methodology and Results
This section will ﬁrst provide a brief outline of the statistical approach employed, and then
the results obtained. Since, the dependent variables are ordered, an ordered probit (or logit)
estimator is appropriate. However, it is also likely that the residuals from the two regressions
will be correlated. Accordingly, a bivariate ordered probit model is used. The following
description is taken from Greene and Hensher (2009). Consider two latent variables y
i;1
and y
i;2 which describe individuals self-perceived and actual ideological positions on ordered
dependent random variables y1 and y2 , in this case selfpospolit and incomeequal. The error
terms "i;1; and "i;2 are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with correlation parameter
, and xi is the vector of independent variables. Following Greene and Hensher (2009), the
bivariate ordered probit model can be expressed as a ‘seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
model for the latent regressions’. That is:-
y
i;1 = 0
1xi;1 + "i;1;yi;1 = j if j 1 < y
i;1 < j;j = 0;:::;J1 (1)
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i;2 = 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They proceed by noting that the joint probabilities yi;1 = j and yi;2 = k are:-
Pr(yi;1 = j;yi;2 = kjxi;1;xi;2) =
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Theseprobabilitiescanthenbeusedtoconstructamaximumlikelihoodestimatorofthemodel
parameters. Variationsinthehistoryandcultureofthedifferentcountriesinthesamplemeans
that it is necessary to allow for both the mean and the variance to differ between countries.
Consequently dummy variables for each country will be included and the (robust) standard
errors are clustered by country. Moreover, observations were weighted using the WVS variable
S017 which contains probability sampling weights for each observation.
Table 2 contains the results of the bivariate ordered probit estimation. As noted by Hoetker
(2007), it cannot be assumed that the unobserved variation is the same in the two equations.11
This precludes comparison of the size of coefﬁcients between the two equations, instead the
discussion is restricted to the signiﬁcance and sign of the coefﬁcients. A ﬁrst-glance suggests
that men are both more right-wing than women, and perceive themselves as being so. This
would seem to complement the results of previous work such as that of Edlund and Pande
(2002) and Aidt and Dallal (2008). What is interesting is that when the analysis is repeated
separatelyformenandforwomeninTable4,theestimatedcoefﬁcientsarequalitativelysimilar
for the other independent variables. This suggests that it is not differences in employment
patterns, income, or education that are driving this result, but something else. Table 6 suggests
that men in OECD countries favour more inequality and on average perceive themselves as
being more right-wing than women. Men in the rest of the world perceive themselves as being
more right-wing although are not signiﬁcantly so, as measured by moreequal. One speculative
explanation for this that might again draw on the literature on gender and policy preferences
is that if the proportion of government spending given to public goods and redistribution
increases with income, then the differences between men and womens preferences may also
be expected to increase. This would suggest that if the composition or size of government
spending in non-OECD nations is different due, for example, to a smaller available tax base,
then we would not expect as great a variation in average male and female preferences. Why
men still perceive themselves as being more right-wing remains an open question.
Howdoeseducationaffectideology? Itwouldseemthatthebettereducated, ifanything, are
lessaccurateinhowtheyperceivetheirideology. Higherlevelsofeducationareassociatedwith
beinglesslikelytobelieveoneselftoberight-wing, whilstsimultaneouslyassociatedwithbeing
in favour of increased inequality. This result contrasts with those for income: higher levels of
income are associated with both believing oneself to be more right-wing as well as considering
more inequality to be necessary. Whilst, the coefﬁcients vary their sign and signiﬁcance level
are broadly consistent across the different samples analysed.
It is not obvious why living with one’s parents is associated with an increase in the
probability that an individual considers themselves to be right wing. But, it is notable that
the positive coefﬁcient remains signiﬁcant in all of the speciﬁcations considered here. The
coefﬁcients associated with age100 and hadnokids suggest that there is no signiﬁcant effect
of either on the dependant variables, although they are good predictors of secfair.
Considerthe variablesthatdescribe individuals’occupations. Thecoefﬁcienton beingself-
employed is large, positive, for both incomeequal and selfpospolit although it is only signiﬁcant
in Table 2 for incomeequal. Like the results for gender, education, and income this result seems
stable. Having full-time or part-time employment is also associated with a preference for more
inequality but the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcients for selfpospolit are
negative. Thisdifferencehasatleasttwopossibleinterpretations. Either,thosewhoareexposed12
to what is often considered as the greater risks and rewards of self-employment are come to
understand better the importance of income (inequality) as an incentive. Alternatively, those
who believe in the power of individual effort are more likely to become self-employed.
Those with non-labour market occupations, that is; students, what the WVS refers to as
‘housewives’, and the retired, seem to be more likely to be right-wing. The retired seem to
perceive themselves as being slightly more left-wing than average, but whilst the coefﬁcient on
their estimated actual ideological position is also negative it is small and insigniﬁcant. Indeed,
when the alternative measure of ideological position, secfair, is used in Table 3 it is positive and
signiﬁcant. ‘Housewives’ are likely to perceive themselves as more right-wing than average as
measured using selfpospolit but aren’t as measured by incomeequal. Interestingly, whilst this
relationship is maintained using the alternative ideology measure in Table 3, ‘housewives’ now
also are more right-wing. The result in Table 2 remains in the subsamples for men and women
in Table 4 for female ‘housewives’ and as such the result isn’t being driven by the 708 male
‘housewives’ in the sample. Students don’t differ signiﬁcantly from the rest of the population in
terms of their actual or perceived ideological position.
Some further analyses were conducted using happiness as an additional independent
variable. Recent work provides evidence of a relationship between self-reported happiness
and self-reported ideological position (see for example Zavisca and Hout (2005), Tella, New
and MacCulloch (2007). It might be argued that it is hard to see ideology as being plausibly
exogenous if happiness is the dependent variable, or vice-versa. Thus, it would also seem
to violate the criterion described above in which variables concerning individual preferences
or views were excluded due to possible questions of endogeneity. It could seem unlikely that
how happy an individual perceives themselves as being determines their believed or actual
ideological preference, yet it might also be argued that those who are happier are less likely
to desire large changes in societal outcomes such as inequality. Results (not reported) suggest
thatincludinghappinesshaslittleeffectonthecoefﬁcientsorsigniﬁcanceoftheothervariables
which lends some robustness to the results. Happier individuals are found to be both more
leftwing and perceive themselves as such.
Also considered were variables describing the respondents’ marital status: married, live-
together (if the respondent lives together as married) widowed, divorced, and separated, with
single the omitted category. However, it was felt that the decision to get married or divorced
could partly reﬂect cultural conservatism and hence lead to biased estimates. However, the
results reported below are robust to the inclusion of these variables.13
5. Conclusions
It is clear is that for whatever reason an individual’s conception of their ideological position
often differs from that predicted by a policy question. Many of these results merit further
investigation. Perhaps the most interesting question would be to consider why men and
women see things so differently. Whilst, previous research such as that of Edlund and Pande
(2002) also ﬁnd evidence for differences in women’s voting preferences, understanding the root
causesofthesedifferencesisasyetnotproperlyunderstood. Inparticular,giventhatthenature
of the gender difference in ideology varies between the OECD and the non-OECD countries
perhaps analyzing further how differences between country’s aggregate characteristics affect
individuals’ ideologies within them will illuminate what drives them. Further decomposition
of the data may also explain why the more educated consider themselves on average more
leftwing when the evidence would seem to suggest that they are on the right?
The broad conclusion of the paper must be that individuals either choose not to, or are
unable to, locate their ideological positions reliably compared to those of the positions of
their compatriots. This result complements nicely some of the work discussed in section 2,
such as Tilley and Wlezien (2008) and Caplan (2007), as this is further evidence not just that
voters are far from fully informed, but that somehow voters consistently misperceive where
they lie on the ideological spectrum. Tilley’s results suggest that uninformed voters sometimes
support parties whose policies are not commensurate with their interests and views, these
results suggest that this phenomenon is a consistent one across many countries.
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6. Results
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std:Dev:) Min: Max: N
incomeequal 5:917 (3:017) 1 10 246;224
selfpospolit 5:674 (2:367) 1 10 201;018
secfair 0:792 (0:406) 0 1 241;880
male 0:483 (0:5) 0 1 278;838
age100 0:406 (0:161) 0:14 0:99 273;750
nokids 0:247 (0:431) 0 1 283;505
livewithrents 0:29 (0:454) 0 1 256;731
fulltime 0:345 (0:475) 0 1 283;505
parttime 0:072 (0:258) 0 1 283;505
selfemployed 0:101 (0:302) 0 1 283;505
retired 0:114 (0:318) 0 1 283;505
housewife 0:147 (0:354) 0 1 283;505
student 0:074 (0:261) 0 1 283;505
highesteduc 4:409 (2:327) 1 8 241;907
scaleofy 4:574 (2:415) 1 11 245;318
seniornonmanual 0:208 (0:406) 0 1 283;505
seniormanual 0:054 (0:225) 0 1 283;505
skilledmanual 0:174 (0:379) 0 1 283;505
unskilled 0:245 (0:43) 0 1 283;505
soldier 0:013 (0:111) 0 1 283;505
ses ab 0:137 (0:344) 0 1 31;903
ses c1 0:312 (0:463) 0 1 31;903
ses c2 0:293 (0:455) 0 1 31;903
ses de 0:258 (0:438) 0 1 31;903
upper sr 0:017 (0:129) 0 1 202;706
uppermiddle sr 0:184 (0:387) 0 1 202;706
lowermiddle sr 0:378 (0:485) 0 1 202;706
workingclass sr 0:28 (0:449) 0 1 202;706
lowerclass sr 0:141 (0:349) 0 1 202;70617
Table2: Thedeterminantsofpersonalideology: bivariateorderedprobit
estimates
Dependent Variable incomeequal selfpospolit
Coefﬁcient Std. Error Coefﬁcient Std. Error
male 0:032
 (0:010) 0:041
 (0:012)
age100  0:032 (0:055) 0:180
 (0:072)
nokids  0:000 (0:016)  0:015 (0:013)
livewithrents 0:002 (0:010) 0:046
 (0:011)
fulltime 0:029 (0:018)  0:012 (0:021)
parttime  0:001 (0:031)  0:018 (0:021)
selfemployed 0:053
 (0:025) 0:042
 (0:024)
retired 0:002 (0:021) 0:002 (0:028)
housewife 0:039 (0:031) 0:069
 (0:028)
student 0:011 (0:029)  0:036 (0:029)
highesteduc 0:031
 (0:005)  0:018
 (0:006)
scaleofy 0:033
 (0:006) 0:018
 (0:004)
seniornonmanual 0:066
 (0:019) 0:010 (0:015)
seniormanual 0:017 (0:023) 0:007 (0:025)
skilledmanual  0:016 (0:019)  0:037
 (0:018)
unskilled  0:030 (0:020) 0:034
 (0:017)
soldier 0:026 (0:041) 0:042 (0:044)
oecd 0:246
 (0:013)  0:041
 (0:017)
 0:116
 (0:012)
N 136,046
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. Other controls include the
respondent’s number of children, survey wave, and country ﬁxed effects.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
.18
Table 3: Alternative measure of perceived fairness
Dependent Variable secfair selfpospolit
Coefﬁcient Std. Error Coefﬁcient Std. Error
male 0:067
 (0:014) 0:042
 (0:012)
age100 0:375
 (0:067) 0:188
 (0:074)
nokids 0:048
 (0:018)  0:014 (0:013)
livewithrents  0:018 (0:017) 0:049
 (0:011)
fulltime 0:053 (0:034)  0:015 (0:020)
parttime  0:010 (0:037)  0:026 (0:022)
selfemployed 0:068
 (0:040) 0:038
 (0:023)
retired 0:027 (0:045) 0:001 (0:027)
housewife 0:070
 (0:041) 0:074
 (0:028)
student 0:067 (0:044)  0:028 (0:028)
highesteduc 0:045
 (0:004)  0:019
 (0:006)
scaleofy 0:033
 (0:006) 0:018
 (0:004)
seniornonmanual 0:069
 (0:028) 0:019 (0:017)
seniormanual 0:028 (0:036) 0:011 (0:025)
skilledmanual  0:061
 (0:030)  0:037
 (0:017)
unskilled  0:059 (0:038) 0:032
 (0:016)
soldier  0:006 (0:081) 0:047 (0:044)
oecd  0:405
 (0:060)  0:021 (0:037)
 0:024 (0:012)

N 134,350
Standard errors in parentheses  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:001 Other details as for Table 219
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